During our first research in Jhakri, an exclusively Muslim village in Bijnor district (north-western Uttar Pradesh), the sterilisation drive associated with the Emergency of 1975-7 was a recent memory. Our field-notes, then and subsequently, have repeatedly registered the conviction that using contraceptive techniques, especially sterilisation [nasbandī or 'tube closing'] , is contrary to Islam. 1 Recent surveys elsewhere in India indicate that 9 per cent of currently-married Muslim women-but only 1 per cent of Hindu and Christian women-say that their main reason for not intending to use contraception is because it is 'against their religion'. For Bhat and Zavier, these figures reflect Muslims' slavish obedience to ignorant mullahs and account for most of the differences in contraceptive use between members of the three communities (Bhat & Zavier 2005: 400) . Islamic doctrines are widely presumed to be central to Muslims' everyday lives. Superficially, Jhakri residents might seem to endorse this rarely examined or substantiated assumption, but leaving matters there would fall far short of adequately accounting for their fertility behaviour.
First we outline how several aspects of Muslim reformers' agendas might seem consistent with fertility limitation, yet the historical record provides no clear impression of their views on contraception. Further, the idea that Muslims slavishly follow a monolithic 'Islamic doctrine' ignores the contested and shifting understandings of contraception yielded by the same authoritative Islamic sources. With this backdrop, we outline how most women in Jhakri assert that sterilisation is contrary to Islam-yet almost in the same breath also complain about poverty and their inability to rear and educate numerous children properly. Moreover, whilst teachers at village madrasahs and senior clerics at the influential Daru'l `Ulūm seminary at Deoband generally take a restrictive view of contraception, Muslim villagers who oppose contraception (especially sterilisation) take a harder line still. Nevertheless, we must situate the fertility behaviour of rural Muslims in north India in the wider social, political and economic contexts within which they are struggling to make their way in the world-the standard demographic practice for people of other faith communities. 'Islamic doctrine' and clerical pronouncements alone provide a poor basis for interpreting Muslims' fertility behaviour in contemporary India.
Muslim reform and contraception

Muslim reformers in South Asia have long debated what Islamic doctrine decrees for its
adherents and what practices constitute un-Islamic accretions. A succinct account is virtually impossible, for the debates were often heated and the conclusions reached were diverse (Metcalf 1982; Reetz 2006; Robinson 2001; Sanyal 1996) . One recurrent theme, however, is individual responsibility for salvation, which can be ensured through the performance of good actions in this world. Thus Muslim reformers have exhorted ordinary Muslims to learn what is required and to 'rationalise' their everyday behaviour (Daechsel 2004; Metcalf 1984 Metcalf , 1993 Metcalf , 1994b Metcalf , 1996 Metcalf , 2004 Zaman 1999) . For reformers, education was key to eradicating the 'backwardness' to which many élite Muslims considered their brethren were prone (Seth 2006) . And, whether with respect to bodily discipline, manners, clothing and speech, moral purification and domestic cleanliness, or living according to a strict daily schedule, women as homemakers, wives and mothers are central in Muslim reform agendas (Daechsel 2006; Jeffery et al. 2004 Jeffery et al. , 2005 Jeffery et al. , 2006 Metcalf 1990 Metcalf , 1994a Metcalf , 1999 Minault 1998; Winkelmann 2005a Winkelmann , 2005b . Tablighī writers are not alone in seeing this 'inner struggle to discipline and moral purification' as the greater jihād (Metcalf 2004: 274) . 2 These efforts, moreover, strikingly parallel the class projects of non-Muslim reformers attempting to 'gentrify' poor illiterates by purging their ignorant habits; the view that education was a the means of achieving this; and educated women's responsibility to create domestic orderliness and rear children for 2 Tablighī Jama`at is a Deoband-inspired proselytising movement to apprise Muslims of their core religious duties. See Metcalf (1993; ; Sikand (2002). whom bodily discipline and 'civility' was second-nature (Gooptu 2001; Gupta 1998 Gupta , 2002 Joshi 2001; Walsh 2004) .
At the very least, contraception might seem to have an elective affinity for the reform agenda and 'rationalised' everyday life, especially as Muslim reformists' disciplining regimes did not include sexual abstinence within marriage. Szreter et al. characterise a demographic orthodoxy in which 'the planning of families is somehow umbilically tied to the modernization of society' (Szreter et al. 2003: 145) and widespread contraceptive usage occurs only when people's lives approximate to 'modernity'. Before that, people tend to say that conception is 'up to God' or a matter of 'fate', something that is not (and should not be) subject to human intervention. With 'modernity', people's views and behaviour shift from fatalism to imagining the possibility of family planning. And what demographers generally see as quintessential trademarks of 'modernity'-disciplined bodies, regulated domestic life and so forth-find their echoes in Muslim reform. Would not the good Muslim life would be more attainable if women's devotion to domestic and religious duties, attention to their children's educational progress, and investment in their children's education and wellbeing are not undermined by repeated childbearing?
Rather surprisingly, however, Muslim reformers do not seem to have recommended fertility limitation or birth spacing. Historians of Muslim reform in the late colonial period rarely even mention contraception, whilst historians working on contraceptive debates have generally not examined documents written by Muslim reformists. Yet, we would contend, viewing Muslim reform in South Asia through the lens of contraception would give new leverage over our puzzles in this paper.
The Qur'ān Sharīf contains no more than implicit discussion of contraception and hadīs do not provide a consistent view. In the pre-modern period, judgements were reached through ijtihād [interpretive thinking] by religious experts, based on ijmā [consensus] and qiyās [analogical reasoning]. Human fallibility in interpreting God's will provided scope for legitimate disagreement and for reaching different conclusions in good faith.
Over time, schools of jurisprudence and individual Muslim scholars reached differing conclusions about contraception (Omran 1992; Sachedina 1990 ). Yet the main schools of jurisprudence all considered contraception permissible, if sometimes blameworthy and disapproved [makrūh] . A person's motives [nīyat] are crucial for gauging the permissibility of their actions (Katz 2003: 43, 45) : conflicting yet apparently inviolable principles required compromises and 'necessity' could be the trump card (Bowen 2003: 57 Zillurrahman 1994) . But were they taught in full (and why, then, is the secondary literature so silent about them)? Or had they been abridged to exclude references to contraception (and if so why)? Or had they been bypassed by reformers intent on returning to (supposedly) authenticated texts dating from an earlier period than the material Musallam cites?
Maulana Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi (1864 -1943 , for instance, is renowned within the reform literature because of his advice manual Bihishtī Zewar (Metcalf 1990 ). He did not discuss contraception there, but in a collection of fatwa he said that the use of contraception is permissible only if there is a 'legitimate excuse' ['uzr sahih] , as when a woman is weakened by repeated childbearing. 4 Although the 'legitimate excuse' gives some interpretive flexibility, contraception is generally not permissible-in other words, hardly an enthusiastic endorsement.
On the other hand, as Islam moved towards increasingly narrow views of the shari`a as invariant and exact, new artefacts and ideas considered of western origin could be deemed unacceptable, because they were not legitimised by the shari`a and other authoritative texts (Zaman 2002). 5 Hostility to contraception might reflect that change (Muhammad Qasim Zaman, personal communication, 22 May 2006) . Certainly, Muslim 3 Musallam also notes that attributing agency to people in pre-modern Islamic societies challenges the modernist demographic orthodoxy that presumes pre-modern fatalism. 4 We thank Fareeha Khan for this reference (Maulana Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi's fatwa collection, 5 Messick discusses a similar shift in Yemen towards more rigid and codified versions of the shari`a under the modernising pressures of colonising powers (Messick 1993: 34) . By contrast, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and colleagues involved in the Aligarh movement were generally positively inclined towards western science and technology, although the secondary literature does not discuss contraception: Ahmad (1967: 31-56) ; Lelyveld (1978). clerics, among many others, often perceived aspects of contemporary western gender politics-such as women's entry into paid employment-as profoundly immoral. For Syed Abul A'lā Maudūdī (1903 Maudūdī ( -1979 , contraception and freely available abortion were a western plot to spawn sexual promiscuity and social disorder in which women's focus on domestic duties would be undermined (Maudūdī 1968 (Maudūdī [1937 ; Maudūdī 1972 Maudūdī [1939 ); both originally published in Urdu). 6 The arithmetic of communal politics and Muslim anxiety about minority status could also mesh with hostility to contraception (Justin Jones, personal communication, 27 May 2006) . By the 1920s, a 'common wisdom' about Muslim fertility was already in play (Jeffery & Jeffery 2006) . Proto-Hindutva writers insistently made shrill claims that Hindus would soon be outnumbered by Muslims (see Cohn 1987; Datta 1999; Gupta 2002 The relative silence 6 Although not a trained 'ulama, Maudūdī was central in Jama`at-e Islami and his writings have had widespread influence: Ahmad (1967: 208-223) ; Bowen (2003) ; Karim (2005: 50ff.) ; Mahmood (1977: 107-127); Nasr (1994). 7 Western licentiousness and concerns about 'numbers' also figure on the global stage: at the 1994 UN International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, some Muslim delegates (and others from the global south), saw abortion, in particular, as a threat to morality and a means by which western governments and development agencies were trying to limit Muslim populations: Bowen (1997) ; Katz (2003) ; McIntosh & Finkle (1995); Petchesky (1995) . 8 Contraceptive debates touched on many other issues: eugenics and 'racial' decline, age of consent, child marriage, gender politics, reproductive health, and the furore generated by the publication of Mother India; see Hodges (2006) ; Mayo (1998); Ramusack (2006) ; Sinha (1998); Whitehead (1996). of the historical record is intriguing, though, given how politically contentious contraception is in India today. In the contemporary period, few Muslim clerics have advocated family planning and Khan suggests that sterilisation is not actively endorsed by any school of Islamic jurisprudence (Khan 1979: 184-191 ). Yet there are diverse views about when contraception may be permissible.
For instance, the late Qadi Mujahid al-Islam Qasimi (once chief qāzī of the Muslim Personal Law Body in Bihar and Orissa and executive member of the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board) asserted that contraception is not normally permissible. It should be adopted only under very stringent conditions, including the mother's health and spacing children so that they could be reared properly, but excluding women's professional or social concerns and fear of being unable to feed one's children.
Sterilisation is almost always forbidden, because it 'destroys the power of reproduction' and 'renders a woman incapable of conceiving' (Qasimi 2003 (Qasimi -2004 of extended families in childrearing, wanting to give children the attention, education, and support they need in difficult times, genuine health reasons etc., all providing that the spouses agree: a broader set of conditions that those specified by Qasimi (Rabbani 2005) . Like Qasimi, Rabbani excludes sterilisation, but 'because of the general impermissibility of "changing" the human body', noting that this opinion derives from the same texts that render cosmetic surgery generally impermissible. 9 Tahir Mahmood's starkly contrasting argument is an extended critique of Maudūdī and clerics adopting a similar stance (Mahmood 1977 People's livelihoods are divine gifts that require effort, not idle submission to nature. Contrary to Maudūdī, contraception is not a western imposition and it is better to rear small numbers of 'good Muslims' than numerous ill-kempt children. Mahmood also discusses several prominent Indian Muslims-clerics, lawyers, politicians-who advocated family planning and saw no contradictions with Islamic precepts, including Maulana Azad and Dr Zakir Husain (Mahmood 1977: 70ff.) . Similarly, Asghar Ali Engineer considers that Muslims should subject contraception to the same searching interrogation or ijtihād (interpretative thinking) that enables them to respond to any social change. He defines 'azl as contraception in general, rather than coitus interruptus, and concludes that contraception is usually permissible (Engineer 2005: 98-110) . Advocating contraception, however, is extremely controversial, as witness the spat between leading figures in the For a more general account of madrasahs in contemporary India, see Sikand (2005b) .
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The numbers of rural girls and boys attending local madrasahs have risen substantially since the early 1990s, although most have ceased attending by the age of 12 or so. In Begawala, about a kilometre from Jhakri, pupil numbers exceed 1000, and several smaller madrasahs serve other nearby villages. Maulwīs play a conspicuous role in the 'civilising mission' with respect to their pupils-bodily cleanliness, refined speech and punctuality, so familiar from accounts of reform movements in north India (cf. Jeffery et al. , 2005 Jeffery et al. , 2006 . Madrasah curricula do not explicitly address family planning.
Some maulwīs, however, are also imāms in village mosques, and are often asked to answer moral problems. Further, the Tablighī Jama`at was hardly a presence in rural Bijnor until the early 1990s: nowadays, though, tablighī parties make periodic tours to villages-including Jhakri-and adult Muslim villagers have increasingly been exposed to their instruction. A recent commentary on the demographic transition notes that contraceptive behaviour at the grassroots has often been conspicuously adrift from élite debates (Szreter et al. 2003) . Further, Obermeyer argues that 'we do not clearly understand … how changes in ideology affect the choices women make-or do not make-and how alternatives are translated into the behaviours of individual women' (Obermeyer 1994: 71) . The case of
Taranam and Talib provides a vista from which to begin exploring these questions.
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Talib and Taranam
Talib's 0.16 hectares of land provide little income, and the household basically relies upon his wood trading business. He earns around Rs6000-7000 each month, a good sum for an uneducated village man. In the first nine years of their marriage, Taranam had had eight conceptions, including three miscarriages. In 1998, her eighth pregnancy resulted in obstructed labour: she was taken to hospital, where Talib instructed the 13 We use pseudonyms throughout this paper; people who figure in our earlier publications have their original pseudonyms. All quotations have been translated by the authors.
doctor to sterilise her-and the girl born by caesarean section survived only a few hours.
The medical costs had amounted to Rs16,000. and Patricia translated them into English. This abridged account excludes our discussion of the importance of having children (especially sons), a significant influence on family planning decisions that often arose in discussions in Jhakri, along with the financial troubles generated by emergency medical care.
15
Although ādmī also means a 'person' unmarked by gender, we have translated it as 'man' since this accords with Talib's meaning here. this comfort. Bas, they close their eyes and keep on making children and don't do anything else! Being sterilised is a great sin, Talib continued, because it is not permitted according to hadis: when a sterilised woman dies, he asserted, her funeral prayers cannot be said and she will not be blessed when she goes 'above'. We asked what would happen to Taranam, since Talib had agreed to her sterilisation whilst she was under an anaesthetic. Taranam said she would not have agreed if she had been conscious and Talib butted in to say that Taranam had done nothing wrong and the sin would all rest on him. Nevertheless, he insisted, it was the correct decision for them. They had few children and were living peacefully: 'I'm thankful to Allah that we're living very well, the children and the two of Talib: She has become 'beloved of Allah' but she's left her children behind crying. Her neighbour Nargis chipped in scornfully: 'Women here don't think about whether they'll live or die. They just need children, no matter what happens. Razia died and even so the women haven't learnt a lesson [sabaq] .' One young woman complained disgustedly about the short gaps between her children ['sab tale-ūpar ke hain': they were all born pell-mell). Another mentioned her sister, who was pregnant again, yet her oldest daughter was already due to be married:
Ambiguities of village voices
Her husband is like a maulānā. 
16
Maulānā literally means a judge, but is widely used in a derogative or derisory fashion to denote someone who is excessively pious and strict.
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Yet another expressed her views like this:
Everyone in the village has 8-10 children. They have to do all the work for them.
With ten children, if you wash the face of one, another remains dirty. If you wash the second one's face, the third one remains dirty. With so many children, there is a lot of food to be cooked, there are lots of clothes to be washed and the house will also be dirty all the time. … There's no benefit at all from 10-12 children. One was Najma, who had nine pregnancies but only four surviving children. By 1990, her supportive mother-in-law had died, an eye injury had badly affected her eyesight and she was in poor general health. She had nasbandī 'just because I was angry'. Nevertheless, she had to endure the scorn of neighbours and relatives (Jeffery & Jeffery 1996: 53-68 ).
In 2003, Najma claimed that some women nowadays are being sterilised 'chup ke se'
[secretly]. Shaila asked if this was not pointless, since Allah knows everything. Najma's sister's daughter Mehmuna agreed, saying that women seemed more afraid of people than of Allah. And she confirmed that her mother had indeed been angry with Najma, because 'nasbandī is considered bad', 'there will not be any forgiveness There's no benefit in having many children. Nowadays it's said that "a small family is a contented family and a large family is troubled". … If there's a small family, there will be less dukh-taklīf [misery-distress]. … With a small family, there's money in the hand and good food and drink. In a small family, there is complete peace.
Despite endorsing small families, however, Mehmuna then provided an elaborate account of the sinfulness of being sterilised:
One time some village woman went on hajj. … Afterwards, a voice comes from above to say if the hajj has been accepted or not. This time, the voice said that the hajj hadn't been accepted. … The hajj of all the people there wasn't accepted. So then they all started saying that their pilgrimage hadn't been accepted because of someone amongst them and everyone was searched. Then one woman was found who had done nasbandī and everyone said that their hajj hadn't taken place because of this woman. So someone told that woman to go and lick a large stone there with her tongue. That woman went and licked the stone and three grubs emerged from her tongue. And everyone said that these grubs are the souls of three children. If she hadn't had the operation done, she'd have had three more children. So this woman had killed three children and that was why the hajj didn't take place.
A few women said all contraception is against Islam. More often, though, Jhakri women said only sterilisation is forbidden and that other methods-pills, injections, IUCDs-are permitted. Jamila, for instance, had used 'Mala-D' oral contraceptives and currently has a Copper-T [IUCD].
19
She had 8 living children. In large families, she argued, the plight of the youngest children is bleak, especially once the parents have died, because no one (including their older siblings) would look after them properly:
For more on Jamila, see Jeffery & Jeffery (1996: 201-215) . Many women in rural Bijnor believe that Mala-D causes garmī ['heat', in the humoral sense] in a woman's head, and that the Copper-T is liable to rise up into a woman's abdomen or chest.
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But we're Muslims and that's why we couldn't do nasbandī. … You'll know that when someone has nasbandī, the funeral prayers can't be said. Hindus have one or two children and then have nasbandī. They educate those two children properly, and feed them well. But with us, this thing is completely forbidden and that's why there are many children. … But just see, we have no matlab [interest] in this world. We shouldn't be thinking about it. … We are just like a guest in someone's house: no matter how long guests stay in your house, one day they'll have to go to their own homes. … Life here is only for a few days. At the very most it will be 100 years. … Then we have to show our faces to Allah. In the next life, this life will seem like a dream. The life there will be for eternity.
Just a handful of women thought otherwise. The third woman sterilised during the 1990s was embarrassed to be pregnant when her oldest children were already young adults.
After a failed abortion attempt, she had nasbandī. 'People say that their funeral prayers won't be accepted,' she said, 'but really it isn't forbidden. There's no prohibition. If you want to do it, you can. We thought, "Allah will do just what he was going to do-but what would I do being so embarrassed?" ' And when we commented to one young woman that many people consider that sterilisation is against Islam, she promptly retorted: 'And if you've produced 10-12 children and you haven't made even one of them dīn-dār 
Authoritative voices of local Islam
During conversations with Muslim clerics in Bijnor town, its rural hinterland and in
Daru'l `Ulūm in Deoband, we explained that village women often lament the strain that childbearing puts on household budgets and their own health, yet feared the consequences of using contraception. We asked if contraception is always sinful or sometimes permissible, what happened to people in the afterlife if they adopted contraception, and whether Allah accepts the funeral prayers of the sterilised.
All the clerics said that Muslims should not normally limit their fertility. Several referred us to Sura 17 in the Qur'ān Sharīf (see above). The manager of the Begawala madrasah explained it this way: It's like murder! Look, it's completely forbidden, because the person who gives us our daily bread [rizq] is Allah. It isn't true that those who have many children are poor and those who have one or two children are rich, they are also very poor. I could show you so many examples in the neighbouring villages of people with 1-2 children who are poor. So whatever daily income Allāh-ta`ālā has written, that much will be received. If we kill our children because of fear of daily bread, this will be very wrong, because Allah is the giver of daily bread.
Disputing Contraception Feb 2007 revisions/19
People can beg forgiveness for a wrong of their own doing, he said, but destroying something that God has made is unforgivable: 'God gives breath to humanity and later he takes it back to himself. So now you understand this: humanity hasn't made humanity and therefore humanity hasn't been given the right to kill it.' Likewise, the senior Muftī at Deoband asserted:
It is written in Islam that however many children you have is a matter of good fortune [khush nasībī]. However many descendants are born will be correct [savāb] , because the master of our daily bread is Allah, who made both you and Our Gracious Prophet says that children are God's exceptionally valuable [beshqīmatī] gifts. But for the sake of a woman's health or for some other majbūrī it is better that a further child not be born. … Many people come, saying that a doctor has told them that there is a danger to life and so they should have the operation. … I ask them to bring the written opinion of the doctor, and when I see that I give permission.
In his view, however, straitened circumstances and food shortage, whether actual or feared, could not justify contraceptive use. Yet, apparently contradicting this, he said contraception would be permissible if the government orders people to limit their fertility, and if a man would lose his employment unless he or his wife is sterilised: This mismatch undermines assumptions that the rural masses are slavish followers of their religious leaders. Indeed, calm domestic order and cleanliness are not readily compatible with everyday rural life (cf. Jeffery et al. 2004 ). Despite Tablighī tours in rural Bijnor, much of the reform agenda has not taken an effective hold there. Rural children usually attend madrasahs for only a few years (at most): madrasah staff often lament that the fragile impression they make on their pupils' self-discipline in cleanliness, speech, routine and punctuality is liable to reversal once pupils return to the village atmosphere (Jeffery et al. 2005 (Jeffery et al. , 2006 . Thus, we should question how central the reform agenda is in the mundane lives of rural Muslims in Bijnor.
Situating fertility
Greenhalgh emphasises the importance of showing how fertility 'makes sense given the socio-cultural and political economic context in which it is embedded' and of seeing fertility transitions as 'products of changes in class-specific opportunity structures in response to transformations of global and regional political economies' (Greenhalgh 1995: 17, 21) . Similarly, for Obermeyer 'the political context is a key factor for understanding the way in which [Islamic] religious doctrine is interpreted' (Obermeyer 1994: 59) .
These insights are germane here. Muslim villagers' contraceptive practice is certainly coloured by what they believe to be 'Islamic doctrine'. But, as we have shown, 'Islamic doctrine' on contraception is not monolithic. Consequently, privileging apparently theological issues will lead us astray. Rather, a more compelling account is yielded by focusing on rural Muslims' 'secular' concerns: economic and social marginalisation, the Indian government's family planning programme and communal politics, and the political economy of hopelessness (cf. Jeffery & Jeffery 2006) .
Social and economic marginalisation
Despite their numerical strength in Bijnor district, Muslims do not dominate the local economy or politics. Crucially, moreover, Muslims in rural Bijnor also perceive themselves as economically and socially marginalised (Jeffery et al. 2007; Jeffrey et al. 2004 ). Jamila, for instance, explained the lack of Muslim doctors this way: You see, Muslims are poor and no one gives them any help. But the government helps Hindus. Even if Muslims educate their children, they still won't get 'service'. A Hindu will get 'service' and will have earnings, so he'll give his children food on time, he'll cook good food to eat and he'll educate them in a good school and pay out money for the books. Since the 'service' is good, they'll make Similarly, Latifan commented that Muslims do not benefit from education because they do not obtain 'service' afterwards. Her neighbour added that this is why Muslim boys do not study, and 'you spend so much money on education and even the money that you have saved will also be spent-and still you will not get 'service'. Rather than that, you should spend the money that you have saved on starting some business.' A widespread view is that without social contacts to exert influence ['source' or sifārish] 
Population, the Indian state and communal politics
During the political Emergency (1975-7) , the government's population programme took a markedly coercive turn after health workers and other government employees were disciplined if they failed to meet family planning 'targets', particularly sterilisation.
There was unparalleled public debate-and widespread distrust of government health workers. Nearly 30 years later, the Deoband Muftī commented: Sanjay [Gandhi] captured people and did nasbandī on them. People were on journeys by bus and they were dragged out and sterilised. There was great tyranny [zulm] then.
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Throughout our Bijnor research, Muslims have believed they were the particular targets of family planning workers and they especially resented the pressure to adopt a technique they believe is contrary to Islam. For Muslims, high caste Hindu domination of health care provision, government and private alike, undermines the state's legitimacy and some even suggested there was a government initiative to eradicate Muslims.
Furthermore, the hate-speech of Hindutva ideologues has a long and infamous genealogy: building on the 'common wisdom' about Muslims' untrustworthiness and lack of patriotism, family planning issues have been increasingly politicised along communal lines (Basu 1996 (Basu , 1997 Jeffery & Jeffery 2006) 
Political economy of hopelessness
The Indian state's complicity with Hindutva-inspired anti-Muslim violence-active participation by some officials, incitement by others-has seriously compromised rural Muslims' willingness to rely on state protection. Communal biases in health care provision (especially family planning) and problems accessing secure employment amplify their mistrust. It is, then, unremarkable that Muslim parents in rural Bijnor sense their powerlessness to plan their futures-a condition that is captured by the notion of a political economy of hopelessness, in which people at the bottom of extremely inequitable social systems realistically believe that they cannot exert much control over their lives (Appadurai 2004; Jeffery & Jeffery 2006: 128ff.; Popkin 1980; Scott 1985) .
Implicit here, however, is a presumption that social and economic changes could provide Muslim parents with incentives to invest in the education of a small number of children.
It is instructive here to consider countries where Muslim clerics have been involved-in various ways and to different extents-in government-sponsored population programmes.
Sometimes we commented on how family planning is actively promoted in Bangladesh.
Jamila was adamant:
Such people can't be Muslims. … Just calling yourself a Muslim doesn't make you a Muslim. We're certainly uneducated. We don't know which child was born on Consequently, Jones and Karim argue, presumptions about monolithic religious ideologies, or about 'Islamic contraceptive practice', divert attention from the diverse contexts to which Muslim clerics and others are responding (Jones & Karim 2005) . In Bangladesh, Muslim clerics have not opposed family planning and sterilisation to the same extent as in India. Indeed, their stances shifted very rapidly when social and economic conditions changed (Amin & Basu 2000; Amin et al. 1996; Caldwell et al. 1999) . By the late 1980s, Bangladeshi Muslims generally believed that family planning, including sterilisation, was not contrary to Islam (Bernhart & Uddin 1990) 
